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1. Overview 
Recent global estimates indicate that 152 million children – 64 million girls and 88 million boys – 
are engaged in child labour across the world (ILO 2017b: 8). According to these same estimates, 
71% of child labourers work in the agricultural sector and 69% in unpaid work within their own 
family. Nearly half of all those in child labour are doing ‘hazardous work’ (ibid).1 According to the 
ILO, the total number of children in child labour has declined by about 94 million since 2000, 
although this trend has slowed significantly in recent years (ILO 2017a: 10).2  
 
Four policy areas have been identified as key to tackling the problem of child labour: legal 
standards and regulation, social protection, labour markets and – the topic of this review – 
education. This report is one of a two-part series. The first (Orrnert 2018) examines the links 
between education and child labour, including children combing school and work; education as a 
tool for getting children out of child labour and poor quality education pushing children out of the 
classroom and into work. This report examines the available evidence on short and long-term 
impacts of interventions targeted at working children.  
 
Key findings include:  
 The existing body of evidence on the impact of education interventions on children in 
work is mixed. There is a relatively substantial volume of research which examines the 
impacts of conditional cash transfers linked with children’s education. There is also a 
smaller body of evidence around the impact of financial incentives to children and their 
families (including scholarships and school subsidies). The evidence on other types of 
education interventions – such as provision of non-financial subsidies (for example, 
Food-for-Education or free transportation), improving quality of education as well as 
transitional or informal learning programmes for working children- is much more 
fragmented and patchy.3 
 Research on the impact of education interventions on working children tends to focus on 
short-term impacts (measured as enrolment and attendance; grade progression or 
attainment). This reflects, in part, the short-term nature of many of the interventions 
themselves. Importantly, short-term impacts ‘do not necessarily lay the foundation for 
long term sustainable results’ (ILO 2017a: 20). 
 Because they aim to reduce the overall cost of education, the impacts of cash transfers, 
financial and other subsidies are generally perceived to be greater for children from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds.  
 Many studies also find gendered variation with regards to impacts. 
 Some evaluations report negligible impact which may be, at least in part, due to the short 
time-frame for implementation of many interventions. The ILO (2017a: 43) notes that 
‘sustainable change usually takes longer to achieve than the 48-month period of a typical 
project’.  
 Longer-term impacts are more difficult to study, although a handful of evaluations do 
provide insights into these (for example, Barham et al 2012; Filmer and Schady 2014 and 
Edmonds and Shresthra 2015).  
 An intervention may have multiple, competing or diverging impacts. For example, 
interventions that succeed in improving access, enrolment and attendance may lack the 
                                                   
1 Defined as ‘work that directly endangers their health, safety and moral development’ (ILO 2017b: 8). 
2 There is concern that official statistics may also not fully capture the number of working children, including those 
who are more difficult to access, such as street children and children (mostly girls) working in domestic capacity 
in their own, or other people’s, households. 
3 It is possible that a greater number of internal evaluations have been carried out but that these are not publicly 
available. 
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capacity to meet increased demand for education, thereby lowering the quality of 
services (see, for example, the unintended negative consequences highlighted by 
Grisewood 2008; de Silva and Sumarto 2014: 3; Zhang et al 206; ILO 2017a). 
Interventions that increase enrolment may not increase attendance; interventions that 
increase school attendance may not substantially decrease child labour (see for 
example, Kazianga et al 2013 and, de Hoop and Rosati 2013 separate analyses of the 
same data from the BRIGHT programme in Burkina Faso).  
 Unintended negative consequences of interventions may be related to a mis-match 
between short- and long-term objectives and impacts (Zhang et al 2016) or, simply, an 
intervention’s lack of long-term sustainability. 
 
This review identified a number of gaps in the research, including:  
 With the exception of the literature on conditional cash transfers, there is a general gap in 
research examining the impact of interventions around education interventions for 
working children.  
 There is a need for more research on the longer-term impact of education interventions 
for working children. In particular, there is a need for additional research that looks at 
long-term impacts for girls (Barham et al 2012: 22) 
 There is a need for more data which illuminates variation of impacts (e.g., by gender, 
age, etc.) (Miller and Tsoka 2012; Kazianga et al 2013) 
 While research indicates that schooling conditions affect school participation, there is 
little evidence that schooling conditions impact on child labour – the relationship between 
the two merits more research (de Hoop and Rosati 2013: 29) The evidence is limited 
around the impact of education interventions that address child labour more generally 
(Dammert et al 2017: 3).  
 The evidence on the impact of improved quality of education is limited (Rosati and Rossi 
2007: 16; De Hoop and Rosati 2013: 20). 
 There is a lack of literature around the impacts of transitional and informal education 
initiatives. 
2. Scholarships, school subsidies and other financial 
incentives 
Poor families may face obstacles to sending their children to school, despite holding positive 
attitudes to education (Dammert et al 2017: 6). Even where education is free (e.g., absence of 
school fees), families may struggle to pay the related costs (books, pens, uniforms, 
transportation), presenting a barrier to enrolment and/ or resulting in poor children dropping out 
of school. Financial incentives, such as scholarships and subsidies are intended to lower the 
costs of education to increase school enrolment and attendance.  
Sparrow (2007) examines the effectiveness of the Indonesian Social Safety Net scholarship 
programme, introduced to preserve access to education for children from the poorest households 
during a national financial crisis.4 4 million scholarships (paid in monthly cash transfers) were 
made available to primary and secondary school students (half aimed at girls), to be spent 
according to the students’ discretion. Their impact was most significant for rural children in 
primary schools, who were living below the poverty line (Sparrow 2007: 29). They were most 
vulnerable to the crisis because poor rural households facing resource constraints often reduced 
investment in their youngest children’s education, whilst protecting the education of older 
                                                   
4 Prior to this Indonesia had steadily improving enrolment rates, including near universal primary school 
enrolment (Sparrow 2007: 1). 
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children. This reflected ‘differences in future earnings from secondary and primary education, the 
fact that households have already invested in secondary education of older children, and the 
relatively low secondary school enrolment amongst students from poor families’ (ibid). Gender 
variation was also observed, with greater positive impact of the scholarship programme for boys 
than girls – though the study does not explain these differences.  
Edmonds and Shresta (2015) analyse two interventions in Kathmandu that provided scholarships 
and stipends to promote schooling and deter child labour for children in hazardous labour at 
carpet factories. The first provided scholarships for direct, out of-pocket school expenses. The 
second, the scholarship plus an in-kind stipend conditional on school attendance for the duration 
of one year. In the short-term, paying for education expenses promoted schooling - but only at 
the beginning of the school year when expenses occur; attendance dropped after this. The 
second intervention had greater impact, resulting in increased school attendance, lower grade 
failure and reduced involvement in carpet weaving. Over the long term, however, the effects of 
schooling incentives (on schooling or weaving) did not persist past the year of support. In the 
short-term, the second intervention also reduced girls’ involvement in both carpet weaving and 
grade failure by significantly more than boys’. Nevertheless, in the longer term (after 16 months), 
there was no evidence of significant impact on schooling attendance, attainment or child labour 
for either boys or girls (Edmonds and Shreshtra 2015: 23). 
de Silva and Sumarto (2014) present evidence that school vouchers which subsidised education 
schemes decreased time spent by children on income-generating activities). The authors also 
find that households in receipt of educational transfers, scholarships and assistance spent more 
on voluntary educational goods than they would have without these interventions. The recorded 
impact was greatest for poorer families. 
In spite of the importance given to raising the schooling levels of girls for many developing 
countries, there is a surprisingly ‘sparse’ body of evidence on programs that specifically target 
girls to increase their school enrolment, particularly in the context of child labour (Filmer and 
Schady 2008: 609). One such study, by Filmer and Schady (2008), examines the impact of a 
scholarship programme for poor girls in Cambodia. The programme awarded scholarships to 
girls from poor households, completing their final year of primary school. The scholarship 
program significantly increased enrolment and attendance rates, with the greatest impacts  
recorded for girls with the lowest socioeconomic status. 
Zhang et al’s (2016) study of the Child Labour Elimination Actions for Real Change (CLEAR) 
Project examines the project’s impact on children’s school attendance and involvement in 
exploitative and hazardous child labour in tobacco-growing districts in Malawi. In the short-term, 
CLEAR effectively provided income-generating opportunities for families and communities to 
protect them against loss of earnings from children returning to school. However, the project’s 
success in returning children and adolescents to school also had unintended negative impacts, 
including creating overcrowded classrooms and high children-to-teacher ratios, which lowered 
the quality of education. In the longer term, the study found that many students who were 
successfully reinserted in primary school found themselves unable to continue with their 
secondary education, because secondary school fees were not directly covered by the 
programme or related efforts. The authors conclude that greater attention is needed to align 
short-term objectives (e.g., reducing the number of children working and increasing education 
enrolment) with longer-term objectives (e.g., education completion and employment 
opportunities) (Zhang et al 2016: 70). 
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There are very few studies on the impacts of financial incentives for working children’s education 
beyond the short term. One exception is Filmer and Schady’s (2014) evaluation of the ‘medium-
term’ impact of educational scholarships for poor children in Cambodia during three years of 
lower secondary school.5 The authors find ‘substantial effects’ of the scholarships on both school 
enrolment and grade attainment, but little impact on children’s (academic) learning outcomes. 
They do note, however, that children may acquire ‘important non-cognitive skills’ (e.g., discipline, 
perseverance, motivation and work ethic) (Filmer and Schady 2014: 690). With regards to longer-
term impacts, they state that ‘it may still be too early to tell whether the labour market outcomes 
of children who received scholarships will eventually be better than those of children who did not 
receive them’ (ibid). 
There is evidence that increasing access to education does not always correspond to a decline in 
children’s participation in economic activities or household chores (see Orrnert 2018: 5). Indeed, 
some interventions may increase children’s involvement in work to fund their participation in 
education, as found by de Hoop and Rosati’s (2013) examination of the impact of school 
subsidies on access to education and children’s work in Burkina Faso. The authors suggest that 
time for schooling was reallocated away from leisure, rather than work. The short-term impact of 
this intervention may therefore have included creating competing time pressures and challenges 
for children balancing employment and schooling. The authors note some gendered variation in 
impact. Whilst children ‘in all subgroups’ increased their school participation, girls did so without 
decreasing the amount of time they spent on work; boys – particularly those without female 
siblings – appeared to increase their participation in work. The authors conclude that in order to 
achieve both increased school participation and reduced participation in children’s work, 
education programs ‘may either have to be combined with different interventions that effectively 
reduce child work or they may have to be tuned more carefully to the incentives and constraints 
the child labourer faces.’ (de Hoop and Rosati 2013: 22) 
Several studies highlight the danger of unintended negative consequences of interventions. For 
example, short-term impact of projects aiming to boost school enrolment has increased demand 
for education services (and, possibly, access to them) (ILO 2017a: 35). In several African 
countries, however, the demand for educational services outstripped national capacity to enrol 
students (Grisewood 2008: 64; ILO 2017a: 35). As a result, the quality of education suffered and 
many children found themselves in over-crowded, under-equipped classrooms with poorly 
trained teachers (Grisewood 2008: 77; Zhang et al 2016: 70; ILO 2017a: 35).  
3. Non-financial incentive schemes  
Non-financial incentives or in-kind subsidies (for example, school meals, free transport, support 
with homework etc) have also been used to incentivise education for working children. Evidence 
on the impact of these type of interventions is hard to find, although the evidence indicates that 
in-kind incentive programmes can have positive impacts for working children in education.  
One such intervention is the Burkinabé Response to Improve Girls’ Chances to Succeed 
(BRIGHT) programme in Burkina Faso delivered in 132 rural villages (evaluated by both 
                                                   
5 Although the focus of the paper is not explicitly on education and child labour or working children, it does state 
that the majority of children in the study did work, 37% for pay and 40% without pay (Filmer and Schady 2014: 
687). 
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Kazianga et al 2012 and de Hoop and Rosati 2012). The intervention included the construction of 
a primary school and the provision of direct incentives for school participation in the form of 
school meals for all pupils and take-home rations for female pupils.  
Kazianga et al (2012) assess the impact of two food-for-education (FFE) schemes on education 
and child labour outcomes for children from low-income agricultural households in northern rural 
Burkina Faso, as part of the BRIGHT programme. The two schemes involved: (1) school lunches 
provided to boys and girls each day at school; and (2) take-home rations of 10 kg of cereal flour 
each month, for girls, conditional on 90% attendance rate. After one year, the study finds that 
both interventions increased overall enrolment of children in school by 3–5%. Impact on 
attendance was more mixed: it grew for children who were already enrolled in school, but 
decreased among children who enrolled at the start of the study. The authors suggest that this 
lower attendance was by children who would not have enrolled in school without the 
interventions/ ‘Even with the somewhat greater risk of absenteeism, this group […] had more 
schooling that if they had not enrolled at all’ (Kazianga et al 2012: 755). The interventions also 
led to lower rates of involvement in farm labour and off-farm productive tasks, particularly among 
girls. There is no evidence that one type of transfer was more effective than the other: improved 
mathematics scores were recorded for girls in both school meals and THRs villages (Kazianga 
2012: 755). The study does not provide insights into longer-term impacts of the intervention.  
The BRIGHT programme in Burkina Faso is an interesting example of the diverse impacts that 
can result from the same intervention. Evaluating the same project data, de Hoop and Rosati 
(2013: 1) find that despite the marked increase in school participation, BRIGHT did not decrease 
children’s participation in economic activities or household chores.6 The authors observe 
gendered differences, as benefits were distributed according to gender (girls received take-home 
rations, boys did not). Girls and boys with female siblings – who may have been affected by 
increased school participation of female siblings and potentially benefited from spill-over effects 
of the take-home rations - increased their school participation, but exhibited limited changes in 
involvement in work (de Hoop and Rosati 2013: 1). Boys without female siblings, however, 
appear to have increased their participation in work activities. The authors find little evidence that 
working while attending school had any detrimental effect on school attendance (de Hoop and 
Rosati 2013: 2).  
Two older studies that provide insights into the impacts of Food-for-Education interventions 
include Dureya and Morrison’s (2004) examination of food subsidies conditional to children’s 
regular school attendance in Costa Rica; and Ravallion and Wodon’s (2000) study of monthly 
food rations, linked to children’s primary school attendance in rural Bangladesh. Both of these 
studies suggest that the intervention increased schooling, but had a more limited impact upon 
children’s involvement in child labour. Although the Costa Rica intervention increased school 
attendance, it did not necessarily strengthen student pass rates (Dureya and Morrison 2004: 15). 
The impact of the in-kind benefits in this intervention was potentially weaker than the impact of 
cash transfers in other contexts; however, the authors highlight that there could be several other 
reasons for this (e.g., higher opportunity costs, lower returns to education or varying amounts of 
transfers) (ibid: 16).7  
                                                   
6 It is not clear how these might differ from the off-farm productive tasks referred to by Kazianga et al (2012). 
7 The authors also warn against making inter-country comparisons (Dureya and Morrison 2004: 16). 
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In the Food-for-Education intervention in Bangladesh, Ravallion and Wodon (2000: 16) conclude 
that ‘even a stipend with a value considerably less than the mean child wage was enough to 
assure nearly full school attendance amongst participants.’ Although incidents of child labour 
declined, they did so at a much lower rate than the increase in education, suggesting that 
‘parents are clearly substituting other uses of their children’s time, so as to secure the current 
income gain from access to the program with modest impact on earnings from their children’s 
work’ (ibid).  
Colombini’s (2013) evaluation of IPEC’s Tackle Project examines the impacts of Guyana’s (2011) 
School Retention and Child Labour Prevention Programme, which aimed to prevent 
absenteeism, truancy and drop-out by providing in-kind incentives. These included free transport 
to and from school, a hot meal three days a week, and an after-school programme to assist 
children with homework, parenting workshop and psychosocial support for children and parents/ 
guardians. Short-term impacts included enabling students to get to school on time, focus better 
during lessons and benefit from tutoring and counselling support. Better exam results and lower 
teacher turnover rates were also observed. A connection was established between attendance, 
transportation and hot meal support; the free bus service was identified as key to the 
intervention’s success (Colombini 2013: 14-17). An additional, unintended positive outcome was 
free travel to and from school for teachers, which enabled them to start lessons on time and 
maintain discipline among students on the bus (ibid). The evaluation does not highlight the long-
term impacts of this programme. 
4. Conditional cash transfer programmes 
There is a fairly substantial body of evidence related to the impact of conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) programmes89(See, for example, de Hoop and Rosati 2014; Bastagli et al 2016; de Hoop 
et al 2016; Dammert et al 2017). Key themes emerging from evaluations of these interventions 
include their positive effect on enrolment (Kondylis and Manacorda 2011: 33); school attendance 
(Quattri and Watkins 2016: 17); grade progression and completion (Quattri and Watkins 2016: 
17). Some of the findings are mixed. Several studies suggest that cash transfers may increase 
school attendance and reduce child labour (Kondylis and Manacorda 2011: 33; Miller and Tsoka 
2012: 499-500 ; de Hoop and Rosati 2013a; de Silva and Sumarto 2014: 3; de Hoop et al 2016: 
3; see also Rosati 2016). Kondylis and Manacorda (2012: 33) highlight, however, ‘with few 
exceptions, the increase in enrolment appears larger than the fall in child labour, implying that 
increased enrolment comes in part from reduced inactivity’. Hoop and Rosati (2013a: 3) suggest 
that more evidence is needed on the effects of cash transfer programs on child labour. Moreover, 
whilst evidence points to many positive impacts of CCT programmes, many of these (for 
example, enrolment and grade attainment) reflect short-term impacts (Quattri and Watkins 2016: 
                                                   
8 Although unconditional cash transfer programmes are not examined in this review as they are not explicitly 
linked to education interventions, data on them can be found in some of the studies examined in this section (see 
for example, Hoop and Rosati 2014 and Rosati 2016). 
9 Miller and Tsoka (2012:  note that there is a particularly strong body evidence from evaluations of CCT’s in Latin 
America, but far fewer from the African context.   
8 
17). Evidence is ‘notably lacking’ on the longer-term impacts (Barham et al 2012: 1). This may be 
because large-scale CCT programmes are a relatively recent intervention10 (ibid: 3). 
Rosati (2016: 7) suggests that conditional cash transfers have a stronger impact on school 
participation than unconditional cash transfers. Nevertheless, it is more difficult to assess 
whether conditionality related to education has an impact on child labour (ibid). Interestingly, the 
author highlights the case of one study of a cash transfer programme (Taysir) in Morocco, 
examining whether an unconditional cash transfer programme open to all poor households can 
be as effective in increasing enrolment in education as a conditional programme (i.e., whether a 
‘nudge’ could be as effective as a ‘shove’). Enrolment for the unconditional cash transfer 
programme was school-based, ‘conferring implicit endorsement of education’ (Rosati 2016: 8). 
Findings indicate that a rural cash transfer program simply ‘labelled’ as supporting education had 
a significant impact on school participation despite no attached conditionality on school 
attendance (ibid).  
In their study of the short-term impacts of cash transfers on the education and labour of children 
from poor households in Malawi, Miller and Tsoka (2012: 516) find that intervention, in the form 
of a monthly conditional cash transfer, resulted in increased enrolment, higher educational 
expenditures, lower absenteeism as well as reduced labour outside the home. There was some 
variation with regards to both age and gender. For example, the greatest enrolment gains were 
for boys aged 16-18, while the intervention had the greatest impact on reducing absenteeism for 
girls (the reasons for the latter are not clear). Boys and girls in intervention households showed 
similar differences in work; both were more likely to engage in household chores and less likely 
to work outside the home, compared with non-recipient children. Despite positive short-term 
impacts of the intervention, longer-term improvements were not evident; the authors attribute this 
to the weak quality of the education system in Malawi preventing longer-term improvements and 
the lack of accompanying supply-side interventions to bolster educational capacity. 
Rosati (2016: 2) notes that the impact of cash transfers on child labour may be reduced if the 
transfers enable investment in productive assets (for example, for farming or small business 
activities) that make it profitable for children to work. Transfers may also ‘increase the returns to 
child work indirectly, through changes in the adult labour supply—for example, if household 
members devote more time to productive activities and less time to household chores, children’s 
time will become more valuable in household chores’ (ibid). Rosati (2016: 7) highlights two 
interventions where cash transfer programmes led not only to increased school attendance, but 
increased involvement by the same children in child labour.11 The author suggests that 
accompanying supply-side interventions (for example, improved educational infrastructure to 
meet increased demand for schooling) may increase the efficacy of CCT interventions. There is 
evidence that this has contributed to the success of CCT’s in Latin America (Miller and Tsoka 
2012: 501-502). 
Several studies examine whether the amount of CCT affects its impact. Amarante et al (2011) 
study the effects of an emergency social assistance program on school attendance and child 
                                                   
10 The first such programme began in the late 1990s. 
11 The interventions were the Bright program in Burkina Faso which was designed to improve access to quality 
education for girls (Kazianga et al 2013; Rosati 2016) and the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the 
Philippines (see de Hoop et al 2016), a CCT program to eradicate extreme poverty by investing in children’s 
health and education. 
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labour in Uruguay, finding that the intervention did not significantly change children’s 
engagement in either activity. The authors conclude that either the size of the transfer was 
inadequate to promote school attendance or the determinants of child school attendance were 
more complex.12 Filmer and Schady (2011: 150) examine the impacts of a CCT intervention in 
Cambodia that made payments - conditional upon school attendance - of varying amounts to 
‘otherwise comparable households’. They find ‘sharply diminishing marginal returns to transfer 
size’ (ibid: 156). In other words, modest cash transfers’ (equivalent to approximately 2% of the 
consumption of the median recipient household), had a substantial impact on increasing school 
attendance (approximately 25 percentage points); a somewhat larger transfer, however, did not 
raise attendance rates above this level. 
De Hoop et al (2016) examine the impact of partial subsidies for child education on children’s 
participation in paid work in the Philippines. The authors find that receipt of a partial subsidy 
elicited ‘compensatory behaviour in the form of concomitant increases in schooling and 
participation in paid work by the same children’ (de Hoop et al 2016: 25). This contrasts with 
evidence about other cash transfers, which increase schooling while decreasing paid work by 
children (ibid). de Hoop et al (2016) find that the rise in children’s participation in work for pay 
outside the household was due to children who, without the project, would have been neither in 
school nor in work. These children started attending school; they also started working in order to 
pay for the cost of attending school. Similarly, Rosati (2016: 9) suggests that if the amount of the 
transfer is lower than the costs of sending a child to school this increases the perceived returns 
of child labour. Additional resources beyond the cash transfers that can help households pay for 
increased costs associated with schooling can help reduce the pressure on children to engage in 
paid work outside the household (Rosati 2016: 7).  
Evaluations of CCT’s in Latin America indicate that diverse impacts can result due to different 
contextual factors, characteristics of children and families (e.g., socio-economic status, age and 
gender of children) and components of programmes (Miller and Tsoka 2012: 501). In many CCT 
interventions, however, the increase in school attendance is much greater than the reduction in 
child labour, since children can combine work and schooling (Rosati 2016: 5). An unintended 
effect of cash transfers intended to promote children’s education can be to increase their 
economic activities, if these are necessary to afford the additional costs related to schooling 
(e.g., school fees, uniforms, transportation) (Rosati 2016). de Silva and Sumarto (2014: 3) also 
highlight the unintended negative consequences of CCT interventions. 
Despite the positive evidence of the impact of CCTs on years of attendance and attainment, 
evidence on effects on achievement is more limited and mixed. Barham et al (2012) note that 
‘there is little evidence on whether these children are actually learning’; even less evidence on 
the long-term sustainability of gains in learning (ibid: 21). Comparing data collected in 2000 and 
2010 from the same households and individuals who took part in a CCT intervention in 
Nicaragua, the study examines the long-term sustainability of learning outcomes; whether simple 
conditionality on school attendance is sufficient to improve learning (Barham et al 2012: 1).13 The 
study finds that the short-term programme impact of a one-half year increase in schooling was 
sustained after the end of the programme; moreover, significant gains in learning (language and 
                                                   
12 The latter may require complementary interventions (see Orrnert 2018). 
13 The study focuses on boys and acknowledges a need for similar research on long-term outcomes for girls 
(Barham et al 2012: 22). 
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math achievement) were recorded. The authors conclude that corresponding schooling and 
achievement gains imply ‘important long-term returns to CCT programmes’ (ibid: 2).   
5. Interventions to improve quality of formal education 
Despite widespread agreement that low-quality schooling is linked with pushing children out of 
the classroom and into work (see Orrnert 2018), there is a lack of detailed evidence around the 
impact of interventions aiming to improve school quality (Rosati and Rossi 2007: 1) 
The ILO (2017a) evaluates 14 projects related to child labour, many with significant education 
components. The report highlights the positive impact that interventions to support schools in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in creating more child-friendly environments have for pupils. The report 
suggests that (short-term) positive impacts include ‘increased enrolment, reduced absenteeism 
and drop-out and improved relationships between teachers and children’ (ILO 2017a: 31). The 
report raises concern, however, over whether these positive impacts will be sustainable following 
the end of the project. There is also evidence that poor quality education had a negative impact 
on pupils – for example, inadequate support for teenage mothers on a vocational training project, 
led them to drop out (ILO 2017a: 21). Based on the analysis of these and other interventions, the 
report finds that quality of education services is as important as access to them in order to enrol 
and retain working children in school (ibid: 21). Nevertheless, it goes on to say that ‘the need for 
educational infrastructures, equipment and trained teachers is rising faster than the capacity to 
deliver them and further support is needed in order to keep children in school.’ (ibid: 34). 
Another study which illuminates the impact of quality of education in more detail is Rosati and 
Rossi’s (2007: 1) evaluation of the impact of a school quality program in Mexico -  the 
Compensatory Education Program (CONAFE) - on school attendance and child labour. Key 
components of CONAFE which were intended to boost quality of education included: improving 
infrastructure and updating computers and other equipment (desks, bookcases, etc.); providing 
learning materials to each student (notebooks, pens, pencils, etc.) and professional development 
and training to all educational staff; and giving monetary incentives to teachers and principals to 
reduce high teacher turnover and absenteeism.14 Rosati and Rossi (2007: 15) suggest that 
improved school quality not only increased attendance, but also reduced involvement of children 
in work. They suggest that ‘parents value quality of education: when they observe an 
improvement in the learning achievements of their children, they increase their involvement in 
education by reducing their participation to economic activities’ (ibid).  
The Burkinabé Response to Improve Girls’ Chances to Succeed (BRIGHT) programme, outlined 
in Section 3 of this review also constructed new ‘girl-friendly’ schools in 132 villages (Kazianga et 
al 2013). These schools included many resources uncommon in public elementary schools in 
Burkina Faso, including multiple classrooms and multipurpose halls, a playground, desks, chairs, 
metal bookshelves and a manual pump to provide clean water. A number of amenities were also 
directed at encouraging the enrolment of girls, such as separate latrines for boys and girls, more 
female teachers and the delivery of gender sensitivity training to teachers and ministry officials. 
As noted in an earlier section of this report, all students received school meals each day they 
attended school and girls were also eligible for take-home rations, conditional on 90 percent 
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planning; as well as provision of support to school management. 
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attendance each month. All students received school kits and textbooks. The intervention also 
targeted parents directly with an extensive information campaign on the potential benefits of 
education (particularly of girls’ education) and an adult literacy training program for mothers. 
Kazianga et al (2013) conclude that infrastructure shapes families’ decisions to enrol their 
children in primary school. The girl-friendly schools increased overall enrolment and improved 
the test scores of all children in the village. The enrolment rates of girls increased by almost 5 
percentage points more than boys, although the difference in their achievement (measured by 
test scores) was negligible (ibid). 
6. Transitional education and informal learning initiatives 
As noted in Orrnert (2018), transitional and informal education programmes can enable former 
child workers to ‘catch’ up with their peers and prepare them for (re)integration into the 
mainstream education system (sometimes they re-join formal education with a group of younger 
cohorts). They can also provide an alternative for working children who don’t have access to the 
formal education system. The evidence around impact of such interventions is limited, though it 
is possible that internal evaluations of such interventions exist, but are not publicly available.  
The ILO (ND) highlights non-formal education (NFE) in its Consolidated good practices of the 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour, including ‘bridge schools’ (defined as 
‘intensive transitional education programmes aim to help former working children catch up for the 
years they have ‘lost’ in working without going to school’ (ILO ND: 80). Bridge schools have been 
set up in a number of different countries (India, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Brazil), in response to local 
needs. In many cases, ILO (ND) cites these as successful, although recorded impacts are mainly 
short-term – for example, numbers of children enrolled in NFE or integrated into formal education 
or training; retention and grade promotion rates. It also makes some reference to less 
quantifiable outcomes, such as increased confidence, discipline, awareness of rights and 
increased academic aspirations of former working children (ILO ND: 81-82). The study 
emphasises notes that ‘there is not one, single ‘recipe’ for successful bridge course. Different 
target groups in different countries, and even localities, require different strategies.’ (ILO ND: 82). 
One common theme identified in the report is the potential lack of opportunities for further 
education or employment for former working children; rapid reintegration into formal schools or 
vocational training is therefore vital (ILO ND: 82). 
Sud (2010) examines the effectiveness of Child Labour Project Schools (CLPS) - incentivised, 
informal learning programmes - in rural and urban areas of the Punjab region of India. The aim of 
CLPS is to support the mainstreaming of child labourers (including migrant labourers), 
particularly those who were too old to start mainstream schools, into the formal education 
system. The CLPS programme provided a monthly financial stipend for students and, unlike 
mainstream schools, did not have ‘hidden costs’ attached (e.g. monthly fees on top of admission 
fees, books, uniforms). These informal learning programmes used an accelerated curriculum to 
help working children catch up to their peers. Short-term, the flexible schedules offered by CLPS 
accommodated working children (they could attend school during the rainy season and work 
during dry season), encouraged retention and reached child labourers from diverse areas (Sud 
2010: 27-28). Once the children begin formal schooling, however, the author suggests that ‘it is 
unlikely that the government school calendar allows for the same flexibility’ (Sud 2010: 27). It is 
therefore unclear what the longer-term impacts of being integrated into formal mainstream 
education would be for these working children.  
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